Volume 9 Numbers 1/2

Winter/Spring 2000

Feature

Putin's Russia
     New Priorities in the Kremlin
     Russia's New Concept of National Security
     Nikolai Sokov

On January 10, Acting President of Russia Vladimir Putin signed a decree putting into effect a new version of the National Security Concept or, more properly, amendments to the 1997 National Security Concept (Decree No. 24, of January 10, 2000; the text may be found at the official site of Russia's Security Council, www.scrf.gov.ru). The number and the scope of these amendments, however, are such that we can confidently classify the document as a new one. The apparent modesty in presentation reflects a desire to stress continuity, for while Russia's interests and goals are supposedly the same as in 1997, changed circumstances require modifications in the means to achieve them. Work on the amended version began in the spring of 1999 under Yeltsin, when Putin was secretary of the Security Council. As prime minister, he presided over the final drafting, and then, as acting president, he signed the decree. Concept 2000 has enjoyed a mixed reception. Some commentators have dismissed it as another airy pronouncement with little relevance for practical policy. Others view it as the key to the new govern-ment's new policy, discerning in it many fundamental changes, particularly with regard to nuclear doctrine. Both approaches make valid points, and the truth probably lies somewhere in between. A concept, by definition, should contain broad policy guidelines rather than specific policy prescrip-tions. Nevertheless, guidelines are informative: they reflect the political atmosphere at a particular point in time and the consensus of the elite on general propo-sitions about the country, the direction it should move in, and its place in the world. By tracking changes in documents of this type we are able to capture the evolution of what Alexander George has called the "operational code" of the Russian government and the country's elite (Alexander George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief Systems," in Lawrence Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics [Boulder: Westview Press, 1979]).Focus on prosperity At least on the surface, Concept 2000 espouses a liberal agenda similar to its predecessors of 1997 and 1996. Indeed, the liberal component has become more pronounced, being both better and more consistently formulated. The interests of the individual are at the center of attention, standing at the head of the list of priorities. Civil society comes next, with an emphasis on democracy, equal opportunity, social accord, and so on. The state's role is to create favorable conditions for the development of the individual and society, including upholding the constitution, law and order, and maintaining a friendly international environment. Like Concept 1997, the new document states that the principal threats to Russia's security are to be found inside the country and stem, first and foremost, from the continuing economic crisis. This time, however, social inequality and the lack of law and order are emphasized more strongly. Terrorism, both domestic and international, receive greater promi-nence than before, partially as a result of the war in Chechnya, which raged intensely at the time the Concept was completed. This new emphasis on "terrorism" probably hints at the manner in which certain internal threats (such as violent forms of nationalism) are likely to be classified in the future. The action program developed in Concept 2000 is so general that, to a reader old enough to remember Communist Party congresses, it sounds quite familiar. Others might find a different parallel equally persua-sive, namely New Year's resolutions. The "to do" list is a litany of tasks that, while perfectly desirable, are so general that one wonders if this can be achieved in the foreseeable future. This gap between aspiration and capacity is hardly surprising; after all, Concept 2000 is a political document (issued less than three months before presidential elections), so every reader can pluck from it what he or she wants to find. Such suppleness is no doubt by design. The goal, of course, is prosperity, but the means unspecified. The exact mix of market and state regulation, private and state property, democracy and authoritarianism is left inten-tionally vague. Still, a few telling details do suggest future policies of the Russian government. Focus on the state First of all, Concept 2000 postulates a greater role for the state than did its now-superceded predecessor. The state is not only a "night watchman," guaranteeing that the "rules of the game" are equally applied, but it is also one of the principal engines of economic growth. Writing in February 2000, Putin defined the role of the state as that of "defending the market from illegit-imate interference, both bureaucratic and criminal" ("Open Letter of Vladimir Putin to Russian Voters," published on the official site of Putin's election committee, www.putin2000.ru). Indeed, this task, as well as some others listed in the Concept, seems to presuppose an enhanced role for the state. For example, banking reform, putting an end to capital flight, and harmonizing laws across the country (the many regional laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution and applicable federal law need to be abrogated despite resistance by the governors) might all be difficult to achieve without a stronger state. While it is hardly surprising that investment is the centerpiece of economic policy, the program is (inten-tionally?) vague on whether the emphasis will be on private or budgetary sources of investment. The overriding purpose of this much-desired stronger government is economic prosperity. Although the Concept's "wish list" is very general, the planks dealing with the economy are somewhat more specific than those pertaining to the political system. In other words, prosperity comes first, the political system second, and whatever promotes economic growth is apparently acceptable. Focus on the individual While assuming that the state will be substantially strengthened, the Concept emphasizes individual inter-ests, not the interests of the state. In his February 2000 article, Putin declared that Russia was "a rich county of poor people," suggesting that priorities were now being altered. Rather than the people serving the country, the country should henceforth serve the people. The prosperity of each means the prosperity of all. There is more than a trace of egalitarianism in this slogan, of course, but the new Concept seems quite firm in its commitment to promote individual, as opposed to collective, achievement. Among many possible individual interests, economic well-being receives greater attention than political freedom. This suggests that the government, although welcoming the enrichment of individuals, will be less concerned with maintaining their political autonomy. For the authors of the program, apparently, the 1990s had conclusively demonstrated the impossi-bility of Russia's putting its economic house in order while pursuing full-scale democracy. A pauperized society was unable to put democracy to judicious use. Writing in December, only days before becoming Acting President, Putin claimed: "Russia will not soon become, if ever, a carbon copy of, say, the US or England, where liberal values have deep historical traditions. Among us, the state, its institu-tions and structures, have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and the people. For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly, not something that must be fought against, but, on the contrary, the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of all change." ("Russia on the Threshold of the Millennium"; the article can be found at the official site of the Russian government: www.pravi-telstvo. gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_1.html.) This is more or less the same kind of "statist" ideology that Yevgeny Primakov had promoted, in the fall of 1998 and the spring of 1999. It is also tempting to trace Concept 2000 to certain historical precedents, such as those provided by Napoleon III and Alexander III. This is not the first government to prize economic growth above democracy. In the cases of Napoleon III and Alexander III, rapid economic development was promoted by an authoritarian government; by today's standards, however, theirs were mild forms of authoritarianism. In Putin's Russia, in any case, individual energy and ambition are likely to be channeled into entrepreneurship and enrichment rather than into political advocacy. People will become wealthier, the country will become wealthier and regain its strength, and, in theory, the people will be content. Of course, the new Kremlin's program continues to profess demo-cratic freedoms, and no one expects that Soviet or even czarist authoritarianism will return. There will still be elections, parliament, an opposition, and so forth. But there will also be more discipline. Between integration and protectionism An orientation toward economic growth necessarily entails a strong emphasis on Russia's integration into world economic structures. This element, however, is treated less positively than it was in 1997. The tasks for foreign economic policy include the defense of domestic producers (hinting at a measure of protec-tionism) and stricter regulation of foreign firms operating on Russian territory. The latter provision could entail restrictions on the transfer of "strategic natural resources," telecommunications, transportation, and other similar industries. Priority is accorded to economic integration with CIS states rather than with the West. An important element is the expansion of Russian exports abroad. Addressing issues of economic integration, the secretary of Russia's Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, has complained that other states are restricting the entry of Russian products into their markets, and that, as a result, Russia loses between $1.5 and 2 billion each year. He has concluded that the widely acclaimed international support for Russian economic reforms is actually "negative." In short, a high-level official in the Putin government asserts that the West has seriously hampered market reform ("On the New Edition of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 15, 2000). Between a multipolar and unipolar world Arguably, the greatest changes introduced by Concept 2000 lie in the fields of foreign and defense policy. Gone are the days of optimism about a friendly global environment. Instead, the world is now seen as basically inhospitable, if not downright hostile. Although the principal threats to national security come from within the country, external threats are nearly as important. A feeling of "doom and gloom" is introduced in the first three substantive paragraphs of the document. "After the end of the era of bipolar confrontation, two mutually exclusive tendencies have obtained." One is toward a multipolar world based on the increasing influence of a large number of states, integration, and the "collective management" of international affairs. This is the world to which Russia wants to belong. The other tendency is toward a unipolar world dominated by the United States and NATO, which is based on naked power relations unmoderated by international law (or, rather, the West is seen as cynically revising international law in its own favor and to the detriment of all other countries). The Concept recites a now-standard list of external threats to Russia's security. The root cause of these threats is the emerging unipolar system (or, at least, the United States' attempt to create such a system). In this US-dominated system, international organizations with the responsibility and the right to make collective decisions-foremost the United Nations and the OSCE-lose their relevance, namely their control over the use of force. Accordingly, Russia cannot exercise its rightful influence in international affairs and is presented with a choice between sheep-ishly following the decisions of the United States or being sidelined. The immediate implications of this new situation can be seen in the attempts to weaken Russia's influence in Europe, the Middle East, the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Pacific. The Concept, however, is silent on how to prevent the emergence of this, to Russians undesirable, unipolar world. Diplomacy and cooperation with states that oppose "US hegemony" appear to be the only means available. This could imply further rapprochement with China, India, the nonaligned movement, and so forth. Reliance on nuclear weapons: a temporary alternative? The greatest threat of a unipolar world is the arbitrary use of force by the United States and NATO. The United Nations' Security Council, which has the sole authority over the use of force, is circumvented, its resolutions reinterpreted to benefit the West. The recent war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo is only the latest and most visible example, but the trend can be traced to the earlier use of force in the Balkans (in Bosnia), and against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the modernization of US conven-tional forces is opening a military gap between the United States and the rest of the world. Ultimately, there is a danger that force will be used against Russia itself when political disagreements arise. (Concept 2000 does not make the latter point directly, but it is implicit in the logic of the analysis.) Under these circumstances, nuclear weapons acquire an even greater role than before as a guarantor of national security. The year 2000 witnessed the first adjustment to the nuclear policy since 1993, when the military doctrine dropped the Soviet-era policy of no-first- use of nuclear weapons and provided for the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a conventional attack. The 1993 innovation was rather routine, however: in response to conven-tional- weapons inferiority vis-à-vis NATO, Russia adopted the NATO nuclear strategy. But both the 1993 military doctrine and Concept 1997 declared that Russia would resort to nuclear weapons only in the case of a "threat to the very exis-tence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state" (The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, December 17, 1997, p. 31). Concept 2000, however, uses looser language, calling for "the use of all forces and means at [Russia's] disposal, including nuclear weapons, if [it is] necessary to repel an armed aggression in case all other means of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or turned out to be ineffective." This can mean only that the previous strict criteria for the use of nuclear weapons have been relaxed. The secretary of the Russian Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, went out of his way to emphasize that no preset rules govern when Russia might resort to nuclear weapons. He suggested that almost any conflict that cannot be resolved peace-fully or by conventional forces could meet the threshold ("On the New Edition of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation"). This shift was confirmed in the new military doctrine that was issued in April and demonstrates a long-term, sustained shift in Russia's nuclear policy. (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree No. 706 of the president of the Russian Federation of April 21; the text can be found at www.scrf.gov.) The text of Concept 2000 does not leave the impression that reliance on nuclear weapons will be permanent, however. In fact, the revision of the nuclear doctrine occupies very little space-barely two paragraphs. Instead, the document concentrates primarily on the modernization of conventional forces, leaving the impression that Russia intends to find sufficient budgetary funds to "jump on the RMA train" (that is, the "revolution in military affairs," a common way of referring to highly sophisticated modern weapons and command systems). When this task is implemented, presumably reliance on nuclear weapons could be reduced. How much arms control does Russia need? Arms control continues to occupy an important place in Russia's national security policy, especially with regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the means of their delivery. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a separate plank in the list of threats to national security. This is hardly surprising, because many potential nuclear powers are located close to Russia, and because the proliferation of such weapons is likely to undercut Russia's special status in the international system as one of only five "official" nuclear powers. The concept also lists among its priorities "measures to ensure international control over the export of military and dual-use products, technologies, and services." The Concept reaffirms Russia's intention to implement the arms-control agreements to which the country is a party. But the underlying attitude toward new agreements has changed. The 1997 Concept simply postulated that Russia would "participate in the process of negotiations on the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, as well as control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery" (The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, December 17, 1997, p. 30). The new document modifies this goal considerably. Now, Russia intends to "adapt the existing arms-control and disarmament agreements to the new conditions of international relations, as well as to develop, as necessary, new agreements, first of all with respect to confidence and security-building measures." This novel provision may indicate a new attitude toward arms control. The agreements concluded during or immediately after the Cold War were adequate for a superpower, but are awkward for Russia today. Some elements are too restrictive on Russia, while others insufficiently restrict Russia's neighbors and rivals. Although it is not mentioned specifically in the Concept, the START process is one example: the ban on MIRVed ICBMs is no longer deemed to be in the country's interest, and reportedly Russia is seeking to revise it in START III. There is an ongoing debate about the acceptability of self-imposed restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons. Of all the arms-control agreements which Russia signed in the past only the nonproliferation regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention receive positive mention now. Conclusion: Back to "Russia Firsters" The thrust of Concept 2000 is that Russia is "consol-idating," to cite Prince Alexander Gorchakov, foreign minister to both Alexander II and III. The underlying motives are the same as they were more than a century ago, when Russia had lost the Crimean War and was in a state of political and economic crisis. Both then and now, economic development is paramount. Foreign policy is dictated by the needs of internal development; old preferences and alignments are no longer relevant. Russia will pursue integration into the international community but only to the extent that it deems appropriate and under conditions of its own choosing, rather than along lines dictated by others. To quote Gorchakov again, "circumstances have restored our freedom of action." Countries that pretended to be friends and partners have turned out to be selfish and often hostile. Russia now has to take care of itself, without listening to advice and guidance that has turned out to be less friendly than it seemed.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

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